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ABSTRACT A voluntary 60-day pause on avian H5N1 influenza virus transmission research was announced in January 2012 by the
international community of influenza scientists engaged in this work to provide time to explain the benefits of such work and the
risk mitigationmeasures in place. Subsequently, the pause was extended to allow for time for review of the biosafety and bios-
ecurity conditions. After almost 8 months, these conditions have beenmet in some countries and are close to being met in oth-
ers. Because H5N1 virus transmission studies are essential for pandemic preparedness, researchers who have approval from
their governments and institutions to conduct this research safely under appropriate biosecurity conditions should resume this
important work.
On 20 January 2012, 39 influenza virus experts from aroundthe globe announced a voluntary 60-day pause on research
that would potentially lead to the generation of highly pathogenic
avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 viruses with increased respiratory
transmission in mammals (1, 2). This pause was triggered by an
intense debate about two scientific publications that showed that
viruses possessing a hemagglutinin protein from HPAI H5N1 vi-
ruses can become transmissible in ferrets. Concerns were raised
about safety, security, and dual-use aspects of the work, and the
influenza experts recognized the need to better explain the bene-
fits of this research and the measures that were taken to minimize
possible risks. In addition, the pause provided time for organiza-
tions and governments around theworld to find the best solutions
for opportunities and challenges that stemmed from the work.
On 16 and 17 February 2012, the World Health Organization
(WHO) convened a technical consultation with the purpose to
clarify key facts about these studies and to address themost urgent
issues concerning themanagement of the laboratory-modified vi-
ruses and how access to and dissemination of research findings
should be handled. One of the consensus points reached at this
meeting was to recommend continuation of the voluntary mora-
toriumuntil the biosafety and biosecurity conditions under which
further research would be conducted on the laboratory-modified
H5N1 viruses were fully clarified by the relevant authorities. This
was considered a matter of urgency, to be achieved as quickly as
possible (3). Influenza investigators agreed to comply with this
extension.
Since the pause began, the two studies that raised concerns
have been published (4, 5). These in-depth publications described
the purpose of the research, the conditions under which the work
was conducted, the study conclusions, and the implications for
public and animal health. A third paper, published in conjunction
with the Herfst et al. paper, expanded on the risk assessment of
such transmissible viruses emerging in nature (6). The publica-
tions were accompanied by numerous editorials and commentar-
ies in the journals Nature and Science, and an extensive commu-
nication strategy was deployed to inform people of the press from
around the world. Well before these publications, the WHO
launched its own comprehensive communication plan that fo-
cused on Indonesia and Vietnam, the countries from which the
research teams gratefully obtained H5N1 viruses for research (7).
These communications helped many people understand the
experimental approach, the stringent biosafety conditions, the
strict regulations under which these laboratories operate, and the
public health benefits this research provides. Data-driven risk as-
sessments by biosecurity experts concluded that this research was
completed under appropriate biosafety and biosecurity condi-
tions. These pivotal papers showed that viruses possessing the
avian H5N1 hemagglutinin protein have the capacity to adapt to
mammals, that circulating H5N1 viruses have some of these mu-
tations, and that nowmore than ever, this researchmust resume if
we are to fully assess the pandemic potential of H5 viruses.
Since the pause on H5N1 virus transmission studies began,
international organizations and governments have been review-
ing oversight and the biosafety and biosecurity required for this
type of research. Some governments have implemented new pol-
icies or regulations (e.g., the U.S. Government Policy for Over-
sight of Life Sciences dual-use research of concern), while others
have decided not to. Careful analyses of biosafety and biosecurity
by experienced professionals have been conducted. The Nether-
lands Commission on Genetic Modification (COGEM) has in-
formed theDutch government that the enhanced animal biosafety
level 3 (ABSL3) conditions outlined in the original permit of
ErasmusMC (as detailed in the supplement accompanyingHerfst
et al. [5]) are still deemed appropriate (8). The Public Health
Agency of Canada concluded in January 2012 that H5N1 viruses
capable of efficient human-to-human transmission, including via
aerosols or the airborne route, are considered risk group 4 human
pathogens and require containment level 4 physical containment
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and operational practices (9). In the United States, the Intergov-
ernmental Select Agents and Toxins Technical Advisory Commit-
tee (ISATTAC) has reviewed conditions for future research on
mammalian-transmissible H5N1 viruses and is expected to make
their advice public in the Federal Register any day.We concur with
the WHO that researchers should never conduct this type of re-
search without the appropriate facilities and oversight (10). Sci-
entists should not restart their work in countries where, as yet, no
decision has been reached on the conditions forH5N1 virus trans-
mission research. However, it is unreasonable to extend the pause
on H5N1 transmission research until every country has made a
final decision.
By lifting the moratorium on avian H5N1 influenza virus
transmission research, influenza experts by nomeans ignore their
responsibility to participate in the global debate on overarching
issues, including oversight and transparency, ethical aspects of
infectious disease research, and potential misuse of research re-
agents and data. It is important to note, however, that these issues
are generic and not limited to research leading to the generation of
HPAI H5N1 viruses with increased respiratory transmission in
mammals. These will be complex discussions that will have lim-
ited value in the absence of broader global agreement relating to
infectious disease research with direct relevance to animal and
public health.
The published studies identified changes in viruses possessing
an H5 hemagglutinin protein that enabled them to transmit in a
ferret model and suggested that both receptor-binding and hem-
agglutinin stability play roles in host adaptation. Now we know it
is possible that these viruses could adapt tomammals, but without
more data, we cannot fully assess the risk or implement appropri-
ate containment measures. To contribute meaningfully to pan-
demic preparedness, we need to conduct more experiments to
better understand transmission ofH5N1 viruses inmammals, in a
timely manner. This commentary is not the place to outline in
detail every experiment that will be conducted. However, exam-
ples of the experiments we propose and some of the benefits we
anticipate include the following:
(i) Identify additional mutations that enable H5N1 viruses to
adapt to mammals. This is important for understanding the
scientific basis for adaptation to mammals in addition to
providing comprehensive data for focused surveillance and
to identify appropriate vaccine candidates.
(ii) Determine how readily adaptation occurs from different
mutant H5N1 virus starting points. Evaluating this risk ex-
perimentally will provide critical data for risk assessment.
(iii) Define the molecular mechanisms responsible for H5N1 vi-
rus transmission and pathogenicity. This knowledge will
help to determine whether adaptation to mammals will lead
to an attenuation of pathogenicity—this is critical informa-
tion to guide risk assessment evaluations.
(iv) Evaluate transmission in other mammalian species (e.g.,
guinea pigs) to determine whether the mutations identified
are predictive in general for adaptation to mammals. This
will help us to assess the actual risk these viruses pose to
humans.
The benefits of H5N1 virus transmission research may or may
not result in immediate applications—accumulating knowledge
in basic research is an incremental process. However, we believe
that our best way to limit the impact of pandemics is to be better
prepared than we are now by knowing more about the pathogen
and how it may evolve. Since the requirements to resume this
research have been met in some countries, we believe it is imper-
ative that investigators that have approval from their governments
to conduct these experiments resume their research, which is of
direct importance to public health.
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